Racial Profiling Has Too High A Cost

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Racial division has been gaining renewed momentum in headlines across the globe, with law enforcement as the catalyst. Social media is largely to thank for the national recognition of race issues; the online foundation of the Black Lives Matter Movement alone has prompted the development of chapters in thirty one US cities, as well as local and international protests and rallies (De Choudhury, Jhaver, Sugar & Weber, 2016). There is loud opposition to the use of racial profiling by law enforcement, and an overarching disdain for police power and action has slowly infiltrated the social mindset of the world.

This is not just because of the sudden onslaught of instances of racially abusive police officers-- it is also the steadfast shortfall of punishment for the officers involved in these situations. Whether or not a claim of racial profiling is merited, it is the unfortunate truth that there is very little that can be done to prove a police officer’s actions are unconstitutional. But despite the difficulty the public may face in pursuing justice for any perceived racial abuse, it is still not at all in the best interest of any police department to purposefully use racial profiling as a protective measure. Not only is there sufficient evidence to prove the total ineffectiveness of racial profiling in catching terrorists and other such criminals, the social ramifications of the practice alone are enough to affirm that racial discrimination is actually detrimental to law enforcement initiatives.  

There is an extremely fine line between what is considered legitimate use of racial profiling by the police, and actions that are unlawful. In his paper, “The Role of Race in Law Enforcement: Racial Profiling or Legitimate Use,” Richard Schott explains that US courts recognize the legitimacy of distinctions based on race “during times of national crisis, such as war,” when “preventing espionage and sabotage” is at the forefront of law enforcement priorities (Schott 25). Schott puts forth the example of Korematsu vs. United States, a challenge by a Japanese American against his conviction of violating the exclusion order issued during World War II. The order made certain military areas of the West Coast impassible to persons of Japanese descent. Korematsu’s challenge was denied by the Supreme Court, as the exclusion order was deemed entirely necessary for the protection of the United States against espionage at the time it was issued. In modern examples, narcotics investigators find use for racial categorizations when profiling drug smugglers— of course, these categorizations are based on long-winded research and review of shared characteristics among perpetrators, race only being one of them (Schott 25). It is held by the courts that these “profiles, combined with other facts and circumstances, can establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause” (25). 

While these instances of racial profiling seem research-backed and logical, statistical analysis says otherwise. William Press explores the use of ethnic profiling in his essay, “To Catch a Terrorist: Can Ethnic Profiling Work?” He explains that by “concentrating law enforcement resources on a profiled group, one is implicitly diluting those resources on the complement group, the rest of the population” (Press, 165-166). In other words, when using racial profiling to extract likely candidates for terrorism from an airport population, the group outside the focus of law enforcement appears to be completely without criminal behavior. Thus, law enforcement is blinded to a large section of the population-- a section Press goes on to analyze as equally likely to house prospective terrorist threats from individuals “whose profile values happe[n] to not be so high” (167).

Further examples put forth in which Press uses algorithms to test various forms of racial sampling in weeding out potential terrorists from the same airport population prove more impotence. The race-motivated variables yield worse results than those resulted from uniform, unbiased sampling. That’s because the probabilities surrounding criminal profiles are very rarely perfect-- they are controlled by human choice, the officer deciding the characteristics that give a suspect a higher or lower probability of being a threat. He concludes that in opposition to ethnic profiling,  “uniform sampling, without the use of profiling, is surprisingly good,” (167) and even goes on to say that the choice between profiling and uniform sampling “should not be viewed as difficult” (167). 

Perhaps an even more pressing issue addressed by Press in his findings is the morality factor behind the practice of ethnic profiling. The lack of citable advantage when using profiling in discovering terrorist threats, coupled with the “huge moral toll [profiling extracts] from a democratic society,” (167) leaves the public with many questions and criticisms. Allegations of racial intolerance and actions are founded on the Fourth Amendment, and the reasonable requirements it delineates for searches and seizures by law enforcement (Schott 26). Unfortunately for the public and fortunately for law enforcement, allegations of Fourth Amendment violation are made exceedingly difficult to substantiate by governmental regimens in place to protect law enforcement (whether their actions are constitutional or not). While the litigable allegations racial profiling can bring down among officers may not be many, the issue lies more in the devastating public opinion they are warranting. It is the same public opinion that is so rampant on social media today-- that police will rarely, if ever, be punished for racially-motivated actions.

Without threat of further reprimanding than a slap on the wrist, what is stopping racist police officers from doing whatever they want? When racial profiling is bolstered by the aforementioned “other facts and circumstances” required for constitutionality, those facts and circumstances are ever more easily objectionable. Evidence that is serving the purpose of upholding racial categorization is immediately suspect. Moreover, with algorithmic proof that ethnic profiling is actually less effective in catching terrorists than objective populace searches, it seems short-sighted and frivolous of law enforcement to merit the maelstrom of criticism and revolt that racial profiling clearly propels. William Press’s concluding lesson is in favor of uniform sampling, particularly because “[i]t is robust against false assumptions... it easy to implement… and it is devoid of moral and political hazard” (167). Especially in the current social atmosphere in the United States and abroad, law enforcement will be lending infinite investigations to social discontent when putting a racially-founded foot forward. 

Public outcry can lead to limited abilities by law enforcement officers to carry out protective protocols when necessary. In his paper, “Race Issues and Stop and Search: Looking Behind the Statistics,” Kiron Reid addresses the confidence lacked by police officers when carrying out anti-terrorist policies in Britain following the attacks of July 2005, when the socio-political climate made them “too afraid...for fear of being accused of racism” (Reid 169). This mindset is something that will only spread as the spite for unlawful police profiling increases. It comes down to a question legacy; does law enforcement want to be condemned and scrutinized for a practice that has no palpable safety benefits, or do they want to regain the moral and constitutional highground, and the respect of the public?